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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: EMANATIONS
AND INTIMATIONS
Robert B. McKay*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Background: The Legacy of Brandeis
Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren wrote in 1890 of
"The Right to Privacy,"1 they sought a means of protecting
against unwelcome newspaper attention to social activities in the
Warren household.2 Addressing their argument to the private law of
torts, they presumably did not anticipate constitutional protection
for other rights under the claim of privacy. Nevertheless, seventy·
five years later that concept, now called the "right of privacy," was
used by the Supreme Court of the United States in Griswold v.
Connecticut 8 to describe a constitutional right. Some members of the
Court said the new right was within the "penumbra" formed by
"emanations" from specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights, while
others emphasized that it was an always present, but previously
undiscovered, "right of the people" preserved in the almost forgotten ninth amendment. 4
It is ironic that the seventy-five-year-old right of privacy (against
tori:), although introduced under distinguished sponsorship and
widely acclaimed as a forward step in the development of the law,
has not yet been clearly defined or even generally acknowledged.
William Prosser has described the right of privacy as a protection
against "not one tort, but a complex of four." 5 There has been some
dissent from that view-,6 and there is no general consensus as to the
exact boundaries of the tort. The right of privacy against tort (or
against four torts) moved with hesitant steps toward general recognition; in contrast, the constitutional right of privacy, arising out of
rather different considerations, apparently became at once fully
mature upon first articulation by the Supreme Court in Griswold.
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• Associate Dean and Professor of Law, New York University.-Ed.
I. Warren &: Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
2. See MAsoN, BRANDEIS-A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. Even the literature on the ninth amendment is not extensive. See PATI'ERSON,
THE FoRGOTI'EN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955); Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 !ND. L.J. 309 (1936); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights • • .
Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 787 (1962); Rogge, Unenumerated Rights,
47 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 787 (1959).
5. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
6. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity-An Answer to Dean Prosser,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962 (1964).
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A further irony is the fact that the device that launched the constitutional right of privacy was the humble contraceptive, whose very
existence was little recognized in the polite society whose privacy
Brandeis and Warren sought to protect, but which by 1965 had
become the subject of public hearings in Congress and in many
state capitols, as well as the subject of a feature story with full-color
illustrations in a widely circulated magazine. 7
One wonders what Mr. Brandeis, as he was in 1890, or Mr.
Justice Brandeis, as he was from 1916 to 1939, would have thought
of these developments. Whatever may have been his original view
of the matter, certainly Brandeis came ultimately to regard the
right of privacy as a concept with more than one facet; one may
speculate that he may have recognized that it was capable of still
further growth. In 1928, long after the 1890 article, Brandeis wrote
his celebrated dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 8 in which he
objected strongly to the majority ruling that messages passed along
telephone wires are not within the fourth amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although he surely did
not then have in mind the specific problem which would be raised
in 1965 in the Griswold case, his words had a prophetic quality.
Reminding the Court that clauses in the Constitution have been
broadly interpreted to cover activities and objects "of which the
Fathers could not have dreamed," he warned:
Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific
abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a
changing world. . . . The progress of science in furnishing the
Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with
wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers,
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home....
Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such
invasions of individual security?9
Brandeis described "the right to be let alone," the expressive
phrase first used by Judge Cooley,1° as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 11 In emphasizing
the urgent necessity of protecting against "every unjustifiable intru7. Life, Sept. 10, 1965, p. 59.
8. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
9. Id. at 472, 474.
10. CooLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). See also Griswold, The Right To Be Let Alone,
55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960).
11. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
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sion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual," 12 Mr.
Justice Brandeis borrowed extensively from what Mr. Brandeis had
written thirty-eight years earlier.18

B. Griswold v. Connecticut: An Anticlimax and a New
Point of Departure
Despite much off-Court criticism of the majority ruling in
Olmstead and some expressions of dissatisfaction within the Court,
it remains true in 1965, as in 1928, that the only restrictions on wiretapping depend on statute, not on constitutional inhibition. However, the creation of the new right of marital privacy in the home
by-passed altogether the constitutional difficulties of the Olmstead
rationale. Instead, the new right was compounded in some undefined
way of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments.
The decision in Griswold v. Connecticut answered one question,
but perhaps only one. The Court held that the Connecticut statute
forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally invaded the
right of marital privacy. By 1965 the ruling on that narrow question
was almost anticlimatic. Twice before, in 194314 and 1961,15 the
same issue had been presented to the Court, but both cases had been
dismissed for lack of standing or ripeness. When the Court finally
decided the substantive issue, few remained to defend the statute.
The Roman Catholic Church, for instance, which presumably had
supported the retention of the Connecticut ban on the use of contraceptives, seemed reconciled to the invalidation of the statute in
Griswold.16
To conclude that there was general satisfaction with the result in
Griswold is not, however, to suggest that there was general agreement as to the soundness of the constitutional grounds on which the
decision was based. Nor should it be thought that those who applauded the result were in accord as to the future significance of the
holding. In order to understand why the case raised more questions
than it answered, it is necessary first to summarize briefly the various
opinions in the case. It will then be possible to sort out some of the
possible future "emanations" from a decision that was itself said to
be grounded on "emanations" from the Bill of Rights.
12. Ibid.
13. Edward J. Bloustein noted the nearly verbatim identity of several passages in
the 1890 article and the 1928 dissent and concluded that "the underlying conceptual
scheme is identical." Bloustein, supra note 6, at 976.
14. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
15. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
16. See text accompanying notes 102-11 infra.
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C. The Griswold Opinions
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court, concluded that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance."17 Itemizing, he found that "the First Amendment has
a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion."18 He also found facets of privacy in the third amendment's
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time
of peace without the consent of the owner; in the fourth amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures; in the
fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination; and in the
ninth amendment's reservation of additional, unspecified rights
"retained by the people."19
Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing for himself, Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, and Mr. Justice Brennan, joined in Mr. Justice Douglas'
opinion and conclusion that "Connecticut's birth-control law unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy...." 20 His
concurring opinion was written "to emphasize the relevance of [the
ninth amendment] ... to the Court's holding."21
The ninth amendment, which had almost no judicial interpretation between 1791 and 1965, is at best cryptic: "The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." In those words Mr. Justice
Goldberg found the constitutional haven he sought for the cherished
right to be let alone, at least for the limited purpose of protecting the
"private realm of family life."22 Although he recognized that the
Constitution does not expressly mention the right of marital privacy,
he nonetheless could not "believe that it offers these fundamental
rights no protection.... Rather, as the Ninth Amendment expressly
recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights such as this one,
which are protected from abridgment by the Government though
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution."23 Finally, he contended that where, as in Griswold, "fundamental personal liberties
are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a
17. 381 U.S. at 484.
18. Id. at 483.
19. Id. at 484.
20. Id. at 486.
21. Id. at 487.
22. Id. at 495, quoting from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), Sec
also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
23. 381 U.S. at 495-96.
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showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to
the effectuation of a proper state purpose."24
Justices Harlan and White concurred in the result, but argued
that the statute should be held invalid as a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, apart from any meaning
derived from the Bill of Rights.25 Their views are more fully discussed in part II below.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Black Gained by Mr. Justice Stewart)
objected principally to the Goldberg opinion. Finding no protection
for the right of privacy .in any provision of the Constitution, Mr.·
Justice Black bluntly expressed his fear that the Court was claiming
for the federal judiciary the "power to invalidate any legislative act
which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or offensive."26
The issues on which the Court divided in Griswold raise vital
questions as to the nature of the federal judicial power, and the
disagreements are basic. It is therefore important to sift the issues
and determine, to the extent possible, whether the constitutional
frame on which the new right of privacy was erected invites further
expansion into other areas, or whether the platform was a temporary
edifice built for this case alone.
·
Of the many fascinating perspectives from which the several
opinions in Griswold could be viewed, inquiry will here be limited
to three propositions. (1) Does the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment impose any substantive limitations upon state
power beyond what can reasonably be found in the "specific" provisions of the Bill of Rights? (2) What is the relationship, if any,
between the right of marital privacy and other aspects of the right
of privacy, such as the fourth and fifth amendments' prohibitions
against unreasonable searches and seizures and against compelled
self-incrimination? (3) What, if anything, does Griswold foretell of
the permissible role of government in the study of popula~on control and, more specifically, in the dissemination of birth control
information?
II.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND

THE BILL OF RIGHTS

There is no specific textual link between any provision of the
fourteenth amendment and the protections accorded certain personal liberties in other parts of the Constitution, particularly in the
24. Id. at 497.
25. Id. at 499, 502.
26. Id. at 511.
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Bill of Rights. It has long been accepted constitutional doctrine,
however, that at least "some of the personal rights safeguarded
by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be
safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would
be a denial of due process of law."27 Nevertheless, three vital issues
centering on the due process clause have caused recurring conflict
on the Court.
In the first place, there has been disagreement as to which rights
should be deemed applicable to the states through the' due process
clause. The catalogue of rights thus carried over has expanded rapidly in recent years; by 1965 the Court had ruled applicable to the
states all the provisions of the first and fourth amendments, as well as
the most significant aspects of the fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments.28
A second division of opinion within the Court has involved the
question whether those specifics of the Bill of Rights that are regarded as carried over into the due process clause should limit the
. states to the same extent that they limit the national government.
That question has now been resolved in the affirmative,20 although
by no means unanimously.so
The third major issue in this area-the issue to which Griswold
adds new dimension-is the question whether the due process clause
not only draws within its prohibitions the fundamental specific provisions of the Bill of Rights but also, by "emanation" or otherwise,
limits state governments in additional, largely unspecified ways.
This question was raised in 1947 in Adamson v. California.st In that
case the basic issue was whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects an accused against a state-imposed requirement of testimonial compulsion to the same extent as the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects an accused
against the federal government. A majority of the Court answered
in the negative, holding in effect that the privilege against selfincrimination was not carried over into the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment-a holding subsequently overruled
27. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
28. The matter is well reviewed in Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965):

Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights Into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV, L. REv. 746 (1965); Henkin,
"Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
29. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
30. Id. at 45 (Harlan, J., concurring).
31. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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in 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan. 32 The dispute as to the possible inclusion of non-Bill of Rights protections within the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment took place among the Adamson·
dissenters. Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, contended that the due process clause should be read to make the Bill
of Rights fully applicable to the states. He rejected not only the
doctrine of "selective incorporation," but also the more expansive
reading of due process urged by Justices Rutledge and Murphy,
also in dissent. 83 While those Justices agreed with the Black-Douglas
view "that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be
carried over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,"34 they were "not prepared to say that the latter is entirely
and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights." 35
The potential for constitutional conflict inherent in the MurphyRutledge view of due process became evident in 1952 when, in
Rochin v. California,36 all eight members of the Court who participated in the decision agreed that the due process clause forbade the
use in evidence of capsules secured from the accused by means of
forcible "stomach pumping." There was, however, a significant disagreement over the operative rationale. The majority, through Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, thought that this was
conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the
privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's
contents-this course of proceeding by agents of government to
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.
They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit
of constitutional differentiation.37
By this time Justices Murphy and Rutledge were gone, so we
cannot know how they would have reacted to this seeming acceptance
of their Adamson position. But Justices Black and Douglas were
quick to point out their fears of unconfined judicial discretion in
interpretation of the due process clause. Although Mr. Justice Frankfurter asserted that "the vague contours of the Due Process Clause
do not leave judges at large,"38 Mr. Justice Black urged again his
Adamson view that a specific constitutional text must be found for
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 124.
Ibid. (Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
Id. at 172.
Id. at 170.
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every constitutional prohibition. For Mr. Justice Black, the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination supplied such a text
in cases where, as in Rochin, "incriminating evidence is forcibly
taken from [an accused] by a contrivance of modem science."80 But,
he said, there is "no express constitutional language granting judicial
power to invalidate every state law of every kind deemed 'unreasonable' or contrary to the Court's notion of civilized decencies ...." 40
Inevitably, later cases revealed disagreements that could not be
papered over with agreement as to result, 41 and the Black-Douglas
view was strongly reiterated in dissent.
Griswold, however, presented the new phenomenon of the socalled libertarian result being upheld over the dissent of Mr. Justice
Black, who is often regarded as the leader of the libertarian forces
on the Court. He could find no reasonably express provision in the
Constitution guaranteeing the right of marital privacy, and he could
not agree with Mr. Justice Douglas' suggestion that such a right
could be discovered in the emanations from other provisions. He
rejected the due process argument of Justices Harlan and White
and the ninth amendment rationale of Mr. Justice Goldberg "because on analysis they tum out to be the same thing-merely using
different words to claim for this Court and the federal judiciary
power to invalidate any legislative act which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or offensive."42
Although Mr. Justice Black's disagreement with the reasons
given by some of the Justices was not unexpected, surely the matter
calls for further analysis when it is noted that the sole ally for the
Black position was Mr. Justice Stewart, while those most frequently
found in agreement with Black were ranged on the other side in
varying degrees of disagreement.
Mr. Justice Douglas, it will be remembered, had originally
shared Mr. Justice Black's view that due process permits full incorporation of the specifics of the Bill of Rights, but does not permit protections beyond those relatively confined limits. Although Mr. Justice
Douglas emphasized in his opinion for the Court in Griswold the
penumbras and emanations from various amendments, he was no39. Id. at 175.
40. Id. at 176. Mr. Justice Douglas agreed in a separate concurring opinion, id, at
179.
41. See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (blood sample taken from
person rendered unconscious by automobile accident admissible at trial); Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (evidence secured by police through repeated illegal
entries into a home admissible at trial).
42. 381 U.S. at 511.
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where specific about the exact source of the right of marital privacy.
For all of Mr. Justice Black's forgiving reference to a "narrow" dis-.
agreement with Mr. Justice Douglas, "relating to the application of
the First Amendment to the facts and circumstances of this particular
case,''43 it is difficult to find in the Douglas opinion a basis for even
the minimal predictability requisite for constitutional stability. Efforts to define due process in terms of "emanations" seem scarcely
more likely to succeed than the somewhat circular efforts to define
due process without any external standard more definite than "considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions
of the legal profession." 44
All members of the present Court agree, as presumably all
Justices who have sat in the past have agreed, that the Supreme
Court has no authority to review the wisdom of legislation enacted
by Congress or state legislative bodies. To do so would be to infringe
upon the legislative domain. Framing the issue in such terms, however, scarcely advances rational resolution of the very real issues that
divide the Court. There are three, or perhaps four, views of this
matter taken by various members of the Court. Understandably, each
. group asserts that its way of looking at the matter provides textually
supportable answers, whereas other approaches produce rulings based
only upon the personal predilections of the judges. The issues thus
raised are at the very center of any inquiry into the nature of the
judicial process; accordingly, a clear understanding of the implications of the various positions is critically important.
In 1961, in the widely criticized45 decision in Poe v. Ullman, 46
the Supreme Court refused to hear an earlier challenge to the Connecticut anti-contraceptive law, for the stated reason that the case was
not ripe for adjudication on the merits. Mr. Justice Harlan made
clear in his dissent in Poe that he would vote for invalidation of
the statute if there should ever be an opportunity to pass on the
merits. In discussing the "liberty" protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, he said:
This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in
terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and
religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational con43. Ibid.
44. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952).
45. See, e.g., 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 106 (1962). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
524-39 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). ·
46. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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tinuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints....47
However much other members of the Court objected to the
Connecticut law, it seemed likely that the constitutional rationale
advanced by Mr. Justice Harlan would not be persuasive to a majority of the Court.48 Mr. Justice Douglas dissented separately in
Poe, suggesting a quite different view of due process from that outlined in the Harlan opinion. Perhaps forecasting his later opinion
in Griswold, Mr. Justice Douglas described "liberty" as "a conception
that sometimes gains content from the emanations of other specific
guarantees ... or from experience with the requirements of a free
society.''49 Mr. Justice Black dissented from the refusal to reach and
decide the merits in Poe, but did not join the Douglas dissent. Indeed, in view of Mr. Justice Black's repeated insistence that the due
process clause must not be read to limit the states except in ways
reasonably inferable from the specifics of the Bill of Rights, it would
have been surprising had he joined in the somewhat unguarded talk
of emanations in the Douglas opinion.
After 1961 it seemed entirely possible that a review of the Connecticut law on the merits might find a majority of the Court, under
the leadership of Mr. Justice Black, unwilling to overturn the statute.
With that possibility in mind, opponents of the Connecticut law
re-examined the constitutional guarantees to determine whether
other arguments could be advanced to persuade the Court to invalidate the Connecticut law. The most plausible rationale was
advanced by my colleague Norman Redlich, who reminded the opponents of the statute that the ninth amendment offers shelter to
certain rights "retained by the people" and that certain rights are
"reserved ... to the people" by the tenth amendment.50 Anticipating
the charge that these provisions would provide a textual standard no
more definite than due process, he argued:
When the question of standards is posed within the context
47. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
48. No one joined in the Harlan dissent in Poe, although Mr. Justice Stewart, who
agreed with Mr. Justice Harlan on ripeness, said that "in refraining from a discussion
of the constitutional issues, I in no way imply that the ultimate result I would reach
·on the merits of these controversies would differ from the conclusions of my dissent•
ing Brothers Uustices Douglas and Harlan]." Id. at 555. Whatever indication of sympathy for the Harlan position there was in that statement vanished when Mr. Justice
Stewart dissented in Griswold, specifically repudiating the views of both Justices Douglas and Harlan.
49. Id. at 517.
50. Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights ••• Retained by the People"!, 87 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 787 (1962).
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of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, rather than in terms of
due process, a definite pattern starts to emerge. To comply with
the purposes of these Amendments, the textual standard should
be the entire Constitution. The original Constitution and its
amendments project through the ages the image of a free and
open society. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments recognizedat the very outset of our national experience-that it was impossible to fill in every detail of this image. For that reason certain rights were reserved to the people. The language and history of the two Amendments indicate that the rights reserved
were to be of a natm;e comparable to the rights enumerated.
They were "retained ... by the people" not because they were
different from the rights specifically mentioned in the Constitution, but because words were considered inadequate to define
all of the rights which man should possess in a free· society and
because it was believed that the enumeration might imply that
other rights did not exist.51
On the basis of that reasoning, Professor Redlich was able to
argue that the suggested application of these amendments would not.
resurrect the discredited freedom-of-contract theory of cases like
Lochner v. New York, 52 which he thought
hardly fits into the scheme of rights set forth in our Constitution.
But the right of a married couple to maintain the intimacy of
their marital relationship free from the criminal sanction of the
state does fit into the pattern of a society which set forth in its
national charter that men should be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.53
Professor Redlich's suggestion, which invited a detour around
sharply divergent views as to the meaning of the due process clause,
was adopted by three members of the Griswold Court, in Mr. Justice
Goldberg's opinion.
[T]he Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's
authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly
enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent that
the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive. . . .
The Ninth Amendment simply shows the intent of the Constitution's authors that other fundamental personal rights should
not be denied such protection or disparaged in any other way
simply because they are not specifically listed in the first eight
constitutional amendments.54
51. Id. at 810-11.
52. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
53. Redlich, supra note 50, at 811.
54. 381 U.S. at 492. Mr. Justice Douglas also referred to the ninth amendment, but
without explanation of its relevance. Id, at 484.
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There seemed then little more to be done except to establish in some
reasonably objective manner that the right to marital privacy was one
of the retained "fundamental personal rights." But Mr. Justice Goldberg, in his anxiety to demonstrate that "judges are not left at large
to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions, ,, 66 raised
new doubts as to the objectivity of that standard when he cited two
cases based on the notion of flexible due process. Quoting from Snyder v. Massachusetts, 66 he said that judges "must look to the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether
a principle is 'so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental.' " 57 He relied on Powell v. Alabama58 £or the proposition that
"the inquiry is whether a right involved 'is of such a character that it
cannot be denied without violating those "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions ...." '"59
When Mr. Justice Goldberg thus failed to differentiate between
the ninth amendment "retained" rights and the flexible due process
concept, it was to be expected that Mr. Justice Black would repudiate the new constitutional canon for the same reasons for which he
had always rejected the old. There is indeed much merit in Mr.
Justice Black's complaint that the Harlan due process argument and
the Goldberg ninth amendment argument "tum out to be the same
thing ...."60
If there is any one proposition on which all members of the Court
seem agreed, it is that there must be no return to the philosophy
that allowed judicial invalidation on due process grounds of legislation intended to promote economic or social welfare. The Court has
repeatedly emphasized that it is not concerned "with the wisdom,
need or appropriateness" of legislation. 61 In 1963 Mr. Justice Black
wrote a kind of epitaph for that constitutional period in Ferguson v.
Skrupa: "The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins,
Burns, and like cases-that due process authorizes courts to hold laws
unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely
-has long since been discarded." 62 Justices Black and Stewart saw
in Griswold a revival of that discarded doctrine. Unfortunately, the
55. Id. at 493.
56. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
57. 381 U.S. at 493.
58. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
59. 381 U.S. at 493.
60. Id. at 511.
61. Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference &: Bond Ass'n, 818 U.S. 236, 246
(1941).
62. 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
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Douglas and Goldberg opinions are not altogether reassuring that
the solutions they proposed are secure against expansion into another
period of judicial revisionism.
It is tempting, when the Bill of Rights is not inclusive enough to
protect against real or imagined governmental excesses, to search
elsewhere for restraints that many believe should be found in a basic
charter. Further cases may provide refinement of the ninth amendment view of the retained rights of the people so as to give the
requisite certainty and protect against unconfined judi,ial inventiveness. In ·this quest for certainty, the tests suggested by Professor Redlich deserve further attention. In areas of general economic and social
policy he would have the courts defer to legislative judgment so long
as it appears reasonably related to a valid legislative end. But when
the legislature extends its action to regulate a right that may be regarded as "an essential ingredient of the free society established by
our Constitution," 63 it is not improper to "require overwhelming
proof of necessity and the absence of other and less burdensome
means to achieve [the legislative] ... objectives." 64 He argues that
although here-as elsewhere-no purely objective criteria can be
established, judges would not be at large; "the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments should be used to define rights adjacent to, or analogous to, the pattern of rights which we find in the Constitution." 65
Whether satisfactorily objective standards can be substituted for
the purely personal reactions of judges still remains for future demonstration. Depending upon where the philosophy of Griswold leads,
either the case will gain a respected place in constitutional jurisprudence as the progenitor of a new source of protection for "fundamental personal rights," or it will be cast aside as a judicial experiment that proved unworkable. The answer may depend in part on
the future development of the right of privacy itself, the matter with
which part III of this article is concerned.

Ill. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS
Even before 1965 the right. of privacy was a variable concept, describing a variety of interests used by judges "in different senses and
for varying purposes."66 The use of the term implies a value judg63. Redlich, supra note 50, at 812.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, [1962)
SUP. CT. REv. 212. For a reflective discussion of the contemporary potential of the
privacy concept, see Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1184 (1965).
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ment that any invasion of that "right" is somehow ·wrong and should
be resisted. The difficulty is that the notion of a right of privacy has
been invoked as often as ,the proverbial cry of "wolf." Its meaning,
if it was ever clear, has become diluted and uncertain through overgenerous application to a wide variety of situations. To determine
the likely generative impact of the right of privacy as applied in
Griswold, it is necessary to know more of the origins, development,
and current significance of the term.

A The Right of Privacy in Constitutional History

In the United States the principal development of the constitutionally protected right of privacy has been in connection with limitations imposed on the authority of government to seize persons or
property. It is familiar history that before the American Revolution
the practice had been prevalent in the colonies of issuing to revenue
officers "writs of assistance" that empowered them in their discretion
to search suspicious places for smuggled goods. 07 In 1761 James Otis
denounced the writs because they placed "the liberty of every man
in the hands of every petty officer." 68 Of the debate in which that
remark was made, John Adams was lat.er to declare that "then and
there the child Independence was born." 69
By 1765 the famous ruling in Entick v. Carrington70 had fixed the
course of English law against the search of homes for incriminating
evidence pursuant to a general writ or other discretionary exercise
of official authority. Thus was constitutional protection given to a
right of privacy against seizure of person or property, but ordinarily
in terms of property concepts, such as protection against trespass.
This great right, translated into the fourth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States as a protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, has been zealously defended; but when
this privacy right has been successfully invoked, it has usually been
in the context of protection against the unreasonable search and
seizure of persons or tangible property. Even in Boyd v. United
States,11 when the fourth amendment and the fifth amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination were sal<l to "run almost into each
67. The relevant history is recapitulated in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
624-31 (1886). See ·also l,ASSON, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937); Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights,
and the Fourth Amendment, (1960] SUP. CT. REv. 46.
68. Quoted in Boyd v. United States, supra note 67, at 625.
69. Ibid.
70. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029.
71. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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other," 72 the factual situation involved a statutory authorization to
compel the production of private papers or to have their presumed
contents taken as confessed against the person withholding them.
Similarly, when the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment
was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,73 the problem again involved a seizure of tangible property.
These cases are linked to Griswold only by use of the term "right
of privacy" to apply to both types of rights. If, then, the right of
marital privacy is to be regarded as an emanation from the Bill of
Rights, or if it is a right retained by the people pursuant to the
ninth amendment, the question that naturally arises is whether there
are other "rights of privacy," hitherto unprotected-perhaps not yet
even discovered-that might now come ,v:ithin this more commodious constitutional shelter.
Candidates for constitutional protection as part of the right of
privacy are not wanting. The privacy claim had earlier been unsuccessfully invoked in number of cases. Those situations should
now be re-examined to see if they meet the new standard. Perhaps,
too, this inquiry may throw some light on the question whether the
newly discovered right of marital privacy has a generative potential
for other, heretofore untested, situations.

a

B. Privacy, Wiretapping, and Eavesdropping
The most celebrated instance in which the Supreme Court has
applied the protection-of-property rationale of the fourth amendment
to deny expansion of the amendment's protection into other areas
of privacy is Olmstead v. United States. 74 In holding that the fourth
amendment does not prohibit the use of evidence secured by wiretapping, Mr. Chief Justice Taft emphasized the "property" aspects
of the amendment's protective reach:
The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of
material things-the person, the house, his papers or his effects.
The description of the warrant necessary to make the proceeding
lawful, is that it must specify the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized.... The language of the Amendment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone
wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house
or office.75
72. Id. at 630.
.
73. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
74. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
75. Id. at 464-65.
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The dissents of Justices Brandeis and Holmes, although neither
then nor since persuasive to a majority of the Court on this specific
issue, have much in common with the Douglas and Goldberg opinions in Griswold. In his brief dissent, Mr. Justice Holmes acknowledged the possibility "that the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments" 76 should be applied to forbid the wiretapping and the
use in evidence of its fruits. But it was the eloquent, oft-quoted dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis that came closest to the views announced
in Griswold in 1965. Arguing for an interpretation of the Constitution that would keep its prohibitions abreast of current developments, he pointed out that "subtler and more far-reaching means of
invading privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain
disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet." 77
Brandeis saw the fourth amendment as a basic charter of freedom
from governmental intrusion into private affairs. In the most famous
passage of his dissent he said:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness.... They conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding,
of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.78
Closely related to the wiretapping question involved in Olmstead is the right of privacy claim raised-and rejected-in the eavesdropping cases. In electronic eavesdropping, which has been
described as "the ultimate invasion of privacy," 70 the fears of
Brandeis have come alive. Any telephone can be quickly transformed
76. Id. at 469.
77. Id. at 473. See Brandeis &: Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV, L. REv. 193,
195 (1890): "[N]umerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction
that 'what js whispered in the closet' shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."
78. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928).

79. WILLIAMS, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counsel's
View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 855, 866 (1960). See also DASH, KNOWLTON &: SCHWARTZ, THE
EAVESDROPPERS 339.79 (1959); PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964); Symposium, Science
and the Law, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1325 (1965); King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights: Some Developments and Observations, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 240
(1965); Michael, Speculations on the Relation of the Computer to Individual Freedom
and the Right to Privacy, id. at 270.
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into a microphone which transmits every sound in the room, and
so-called parabolic microphones can eavesdrop on a conversation in
a room across a hundred-foot-wide street, but there is no constitutional protection against such intrusions.80 Even the wiretapping
prohibitions in section 605 of the Federal Communications Act offer
at best limited protection to conversations thought private by their
direct participants. 81
C. Other Potential Right-of-Privacy Claims
The privacy argument has been urged and rejected in other
cases, but always in relation to some claimed violation of the fourth
or fifth amendments-never in connection with Mr. Justice Douglas'
"penumbra" concept or Mr: Justice Goldberg's ninth amendment
argument. In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 82 for example,
the Court rejected a claim that radio programs on buses and streetcars of a private company regulated by the District of Columbia
invaded the privacy rights of passengers in violation of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Mr. Justice Douglas was the
only dissenter:
The case comes down to the meaning of "liberty" as used in
the Fifth Amendment. Liberty in the constitutional sense must
mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint;
it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of
freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of
all freedom.
If we remembered this lesson taught by the First Amendment [the "sanctity of thought and belief" as "important aspects
of the constitutional right to be let alone"], I do not believe
we would construe "liberty" within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment as narrowly as the Court does. 83
In Frank v. Maryland 84 the Court specifically acknowledged that
the fourth and fifth amendments protect "the right to be secure from
intrusion into personal privacy" 85 and the "intimately related" right
of self-protection-"the right to resist unauthorized entry which has
as its design the securing of information which may be used to
effect a further deprivation of life or liberty or property." 86 But in
80. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129 (1942); cf. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Lanza v. New York,
370 U .s. 139 (1962).
81. See generally Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 CoLUM. L. REV. 165 (1952).
82. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
83. Id. at 467-68. See also DOUGLAS, Tm: RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 87 (1958).
84. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
85. Id. at 365.
86. Ibid.
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that case the action complained against was the demand made by
a municipal health inspector without a search warrant to enter
private premises in search of health hazards. Since no evidence for
criminal prosecutions was sought to be seized, a majority of the
Court denied the existence of any right of privacy sufficient to preclude the search. The four dissenters, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas, thought that the decision "greatly [diluted] the right of
privacy." 87
The privacy right has sometimes been discussed by individual
members of the Court, usually in concurring or dissenting opinions,
in connection with rights said to be protectep. by constitutional provisions other than the fourth and fifth amendments. Thus, it has
been suggested that the first amendment-related freedoms of speech,
conscience, and association are aspects of the right to privacy, because
"the right of privacy implicit in the First Amendment creates an
area into which the Government may not enter." 88 Accordingly,
it has also been suggested that "the interest in privacy as it relates
to freedom of speech and assembly" 89 is sufficiently important to
carry with it a presumption of noninterference by state investigatory
authorities except upon a "showing by the State sufficient to counterbalance"90 the privacy right. Similar considerations may also be
relevant for some Justices in other first amendment areas, including
problems arising out of loyalty oaths, 91 admission to the bar,92
membership disclosure requirements, 93 and freedom of travel. 94
But other members of the Court have continued to think of these
matters solely in terms of the first amendment prohibitions, without
considering the potential privacy aspects of the asserted rights. Since
the Court has often been closely divided on these cases, with decisions
wavering from one side to the other of the thin line that divides
governmental power from individual liberties, it is interesting to
speculate whether elevation of the privacy right to majority status
in Griswold may also foretell a new way of looking at those aspects
87. Id. at 371.
.88. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 570 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring). See also id. at 565, 569.
89. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 107 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Ibid.
91. E.g., Baggett v• .Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
92. E.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). ·
.
93. E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 861 U.S. 516
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
94. E.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 857
U.S. 116 (1958).
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of the right to be let alone that depend on the first amendment for
their protection against governmental intrusion.
When the Court has recognized a right of privacy in some context other than the traditional fourth and fifth amendment protection against the taking of property to be used as evidence to aid in
criminal prosecutions (and apart from the first amendment areas
mentioned above), the privacy concept has sometimes been invoked
as a mak.eweight to help in downgrading claimed invasions of other
constitutional rights. Thus, in Breard v. Alexandria,95 the Court
upheld an ordinance banning door-to-door solicitation by out-of-state
solicitors for magazine subscriptions. The balance was said to be
"between some householder's desire for privacy and the publisher's
right to distribute publications in the precise way that those soliciting
for him think brings the best results." 96 The four dissenters could
scarcely see this as a privacy right at all, but as an excuse to downgrade what some saw as first amendment rights97 and others as the
interest in the free flow of interstate commerce.98
Another item in this pre-Griswold catalogue of privacy rights is
Skinner v. Oklahoma,99 in .which the Court offered protection
against involuntary sterilization pursuant to a statutory authorization
that was discriminatory in its application. That judgment, however,
rested solely on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to protect the dignity and personality of the individual.
The short of it is that the right of privacy has been much discussed in the Supreme Court opinions, particularly in recent years,
but substantively nothing much came of that discussion until Griswold. Except for the fourth amendment holdings, the talk about
privacy rights was not supported with judgments in vindication of
privacy rights until Griswold. Even in the fourth amendment cases,
despite an increasing tendency to talk about that amendment's protection of privacy rights the holdings seem not to have gone beyond
the 1886 decision in Boyd v. United States. However closely the
fourth and fifth amendments may have been linked by the Boyd case,
still the constitutional protection did no more than immunize from
seizure, real or constructive. The continuing refusal to exclude evidence gained through wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, and
the refusal to apply the fourth amendment to "civil" searches, necessarily demonstrate that the right of privacy, unlike other individual
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

341 U.S. 622 (1951).
Id. at 644.
Id. at 649 (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 645 (Vinson, C.J., and Douglas, J., dissenting).
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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liberty protections, has not significantly adapted itself to develop·
ments after 1791.
Griswold does not necessarily foretell evolution in the rather
fixed doctrines ·of the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment
right of privacy discussed above bears little resemblance to the
right of marital privacy in Griswold. For purposes of comparison and
contrast, it may be helpful to think of the fourth amendment right
of privacy as a procedural protection-a limitation upon the means
by which evidence can be obtained for the purpose of securing a
criminal conviction. The right of marital privacy, on the other hand,
is exclusively substantive; when applicable, 100 it nullifies positive law
enacted pursuant to otherwise valid legislative power. Accordingly,
there is no necessary generative force in Griswold in relation to the
traditional fourth amendID.ent area.
While it is thus perfectly possible for the two kinds of privacy
to stand entirely apart, never quite touching, it seems more likely
that the new privacy will indeed have an impact on the old. However different from each other they may be, a mutually developing
relationship might be worked out. For example, even if it is ·con·
ceded that wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping are not violations of the fourth or fifth amendments, the Douglas "penumbra"
argument could be advanced to establish that "emanations" from
the Bill of Rights forbid wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping.
(If this argument seems a bit thin to overcome long-established doctrine-as well it might-the ninth amendment argument may offer
greater promise.) If there is a right to marital privacy in the home,
why should there not be as well a right of privacy in the home or
place of business against the unwelcome intrusion of uninvited participants in conversations intended to be private? If the right of
. privacy is not to be limited narrowly to the facts of Griswold, but is
100. In describing the new right as that of marital privacy, emphasis should apparently be on the word "marital." The concurring opinions by Justices Goldberg and
White state explicitly that the holding "in no way interferes with a State's proper
regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct," 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J,, con•
curring); id. at 505-07 (White, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Harlan had made the same
point in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961), and he adopted those
views in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). These expressions of willingness to allow the states to continue to forbid adultery, homosexuality, and other
disfavored sexual acts make the result in Griswold more acceptable to a society that
has always voiced its public disapproval of sexual nonconformity; they do not, how•
ever, make easier the task of the disinterested student of the law who is required to
seek distinctions between the right of marital privacy and the nonright of unwedded
privacy. Perhaps better than anything else this emphasizes that Griswold is not a
fourth amendment case. The fourth amendment, after all, protects the privacy of the
home as to illicit activity to the same extent that it protects against disclosure of
innocent activities.
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meant to foretell broad protection for the dignity of man and the
inviolability of his rights of personality, then should not its applicabi~ity be considered in connection with legislative investigations,
loyalty oaths, freedom to travel, religious freedom, and other first
amendment-related rights?
Far more important than the result on the narrowly special facts
of Griswold is the question whether the principle there announced
can have these important collateral consequences. It is certainly more
than a bare possibility.
IV.

GOVERNMENT AND THE DISSEMINATION
OF BIRTH CONTROL INFORMATION

If the Constitution of the United States is to remain relevant to
government in the latter half of the twentieth century, it must
provide viable answers to the difficult questions of governmental
structure and power. It has already been observed that the Griswold
case has significance in relation to modern concepts of federalism.
Another twentieth century problem is the growing tension between
the assumed necessity for a strong state largely devoted to the achievement of social welfare ends and the equally pressing need to preserve
the individual from the gathering forces of big government. Intimations from Griswold contribute to that continuing dialogue.
Before the Supreme Court decision in Griswold, the underlying
social issue reflected in that case appeared to be a fairly narrow one.
In a 1956 symposium, no one challenged this statement of the thenrelevant question: "Should the state prohibit or otherwise regulate
the sale or use of contraceptives?"101 The new question pertinent to
the immediate discussion is whether any government, state or federal,
may disseminate birth control information through public health
clinics and social welfare programs in the United States and through
international aid programs abroad.
At first impression the problem might not seem very difficult.
In states where the giving of birth control information has not
raised serious political or religious problems, such information has
been made available. Moreover, the once-substantial opposition to
the traffic in birth control devices as articles of commerce has been
101. Symposium-Morals, Medicine, and the Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. II57, II58 (1956).
Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., almost alone among the contributors to that symposium,
noted another question, which he relegated to footnote attention: "A few states now
have public birth control clinics. There is perhaps a small issue here as to whether
a Catholic taxpayer has any basis for protesting this use of public funds. There is a
difference between permitting contraception and sponsoring it." Kalven, A Special Corner of Civil Liberties-A Legal View, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1223, 1224-25 n.l (1956).
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gradually eroded.102 If the states' power to prohibit the use of contraceptives is denied, governmental participation in the informationdispensing process might seem assured. However, a new argument
against any governmental role at all in this process has been raised,
principally by spokesmen for the Roman Catholic Church.
It is well known that the Catholic Church has long objected
on moral grounds to the use of contraceptives. Indeed, in days past
Catholic authorities in Massachusetts supported "Vote God's Way"
campaigns against repeal of the state's laws prohibiting the dissemination of birth control information. Seeking statutory prohibition
even as to non-members of that church was not illogical as a means of
attaining religious objectives. So long as anti-use and anti-dissemination statutes could be kept alive, state-supported family planning programs could scarcely be proposed, and even private clinics
would operate at the peril of police action.
Gradually, however, Catholic support of these statutes weakened,
although without any change in the moral prohibition applicable to
members of that church. Indeed, the Catholic Conference on Civil
Liberties presented an amicus curiae brief in Griswold supporting
invalidation, on privacy grounds, of the Connecticut law.
When the Supreme Court based its invalidation of the Connecticut law squarely on the privacy ground, few Catholic leaders expressed public disapproval, and some Catholics identified with the
liberal tradition announced cautious approval. 103 Indeed, in a statement that had been approved before release by the National Catholic
Welfare Conference, William Ball, general counsel for the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, had some kind words for the decision. 104
But the focus had by this time shifted. Mr. Ball voiced Conference
approval of Griswold in the context of his testimony in opposition to
a Senate bi11105 which proposed authorization for the United States
"more effectively to deal with rapid population growth throughout
the world and the problems arising from or connected with such
growth...." Catholic critics of the bill feared that it was the first
step, not only to promote study of population control, which they
102. See Kalven, supra note 101, at 1224-29; Ploscowe, The Place of Law in MedicoMoral Problems: A Legal View, 31 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 1238, 1240-41 (1956): Comment,
History and Future of the Legal Battle Over Birth Control, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 275
(1964).
.
103. See Ball, The Court and Birth Control, 82 COMMONWEAL 490 (1965). Sec also
N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1965, p. 42, col. I; id., Aug. 29, 1965, p. E5, col. I.
104. Statement prepared for presentation August 24, 1965, before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Aid Expenditures of tJ?.e Senate Committee on Government Operations
(mimco.).
105. S. 1676 (89th Cong., 1st Sess.).
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did not oppose, but al_so to facilitate governmental efforts to disseminate birth control information at home and abroad.
It is somewhat ironic that the arguments against the bill were
based on the new-found friend, the right of privacy. The argument
went something like this: For better or for worse, this is the age of
the welfare state. The welfare state and its companion, big government, raise problems for the individual, particularly as he seeks to
preserve his identity from being submerged into the undifferentiated
mass. Grounding of the Griswold decision on the right of privacy is
said to illustrate again the Supreme Court's concern with individual
liberty, already manifested in other areas. It is suggested that the
School Prayer Case, 106 for example, manifested another facet of the
same effort by the Court to protect against governmental intrusion
into areas that should remain private. In forbidding state sponsorship of prayers in public schools, the Supreme Court is said to have
"found coercion to be inherent in the child-state relationship, even
though the project was broadly considered good for children and
for society, and even though the child could be exempt by claiming his privilege of non-participation." 107
We have been reminded of related dangers that lurk in social
welfare programs. Professor Charles Reich has pointed out the
dangers to privacy in the administration of welfare programs, and
he cautions that some welfare regulations attempt "to impose a
standard of moral behavior on beneficiaries."108 Building upon all
these concerns, Mr. Ball fears that the use of state power to disseminate birth control information may be regarded as coercive by
the recipients. He suggests:
The reach of the inquisitorial power of the state in the caseworker-client relationship, moreover, raises most serious questions precisely in the area of privacy now constitutionally zoned
by the Supreme Court. Does it extend to such matters as frequency of sexual intercourse, ethical outlook, savings habits,
drinking habits? What may be made a matter of record, and
what guarantees of confidentiality are legally mandated?" How far
(apart from birth control) may the "planning" in family planning be carried?109
Even well-intentioned welfare workers, he fears, may tend to develop
106. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
107. Statement, supra note 104, at 9.
108. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare-The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245, 1247 (1965). See also Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social
Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963).
109. Ball, supra note 103, at 493.
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a "highly managerial paternalism toward the poor," 110 based upon
"unspoken puritanical assumptions respecting 'undesirables.' " 111
These suggestions seem alarming at first, but they may be only
alarmist. It is doubtless true that there are possibilities for abuse,
even serious abuse, in any governmental program. Even as members
of disadvantaged groups are especially vulnerable to expressions of
governmental hostility, they are also especially likely to misinterpret
poorly administered attempts at governmental solicitude. But that
is not to say that programs with humanitarian objectives should not
be attempted because of the danger of overreaching. The risk involved should instead emphasize the need for careful surveillance of
the administration of useful programs that are susceptible to abuse
through excess of good will. Difficulties of administration should not
be elevated to constitutional status.
Nowhere is the problem more acute than in the area of birth
control information. If the dangers are substantial, the needs are
equally so. It is perfectly clear that birth control information and
anti-contraceptive devices are readily available to the well-to-do and
middle classes of American society, where they are widely used. To
deny similar information and equal availability to the poor and illinformed seems likely to add yet another discrimination to those already suffered by the poor. Disadvantage because of poverty is already
widespread, and must not be extended. To do so under a claim of
privacy would make hollow the victory for individual liberty in
Griswold.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.

